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PUTTING THE SUPER BACK IN THE SUPERVISION OF
INTERNATIONAL BANKING, POST-BCCI
DANIEL M. LAIFER
INTRODUCTION
Historically, banks that were chartered in a given country conducted
most of their business in that domestic market. In the past decade, how-
ever, financial institutions both in the United States and in other nations
have rapidly expanded their overseas offices.' Indeed, banking transac-
tions have become increasingly global, setting the stage for even greater
transnational financial activity in the 1990s.2 This cross-border presence
of banks, though, has disturbing potential to increase the risk of bank
failure and reduce the soundness of international banking.3
Regulation of this now highly mobile, innovative, and risky financial
environment requires supervisory finesse. While banking has become in-
temational, supervision has not. Recent international bank scandals,
particularly the ignoble closure of the worldwide operations of the Bank
of Credit and Commerce International ("BCCI"),4 illustrate the disas-
trous effects of deficient supervision of the international banking system.
While BCCI and the U.S. Department of Justice have reached a mone-
tary settlement, further investigations into what some observers believe
to be the biggest financial fraud in history will undoubtedly continue for
1. The long period of prosperity in the 1960s and early 1970s led to substantial in-
creases in global operations of industrial and commercial companies. This, in turn,
caused an increase in international banking activity, since banks tend to follow their cus-
tomers. See Quinn, Cross-Border Regulation of Banking, in Legal Issues of Cross-Border
Banking 109, 110 (1989) [hereinafter Cross-Border Banking]. By the end of 1990, over
200 foreign banks, with aggregate assets of $800 billion, were present in the United States.
Moreover, branches and agencies of foreign banks operating in the U.S. had assets of
about $626 billion, or 18% of the total bank assets in the nation. See Operations of For-
eign Banks in the US.: Hearings Before the House Banking, Finance and Urban Affais
Comm., 102d Cong., 1st Sess. *1 (June 11, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis library,
Fednews file [hereinafter Foreign Banks Hearings] (statement of Rep. Gonzalez, chair-
man); see also J. Baker, International Bank Regulation 7-12 (1978) (discussing the
growth of foreign banks in the U.S. in the late 1970s).
2. From 1982 to 1989, the commercial and industrial loans made by foreign-owned
U.S. banks increased from $83 billion to $178.9 billion. The amount of deposits grew
from $148.6 billion in 1982 to $370.4 billion in 1989. The assets of foreign-owned U.S.
banks increased from $285.4 billion in 1982 to $695.6 billion in 1989. See Foreign Banks
in the United States, Am. Banker, Feb. 27, 1990, at 18A [hereinafter Foreign Banks].
3. The collapse of a single bank will have global consequences, not only in the bank-
ing industry, but also in financial markets. For example, English lawyers have estimated
that the closure of BCCI jeopardized $8.7 billion in international trade because it compli-
cated payments for export contracts handled by the bank. See BCC! Failure Said to
Jeopardize $8.7 Billion in International Trade, Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) No. 147,
at A-9 (July 26, 1991); see also Baker, supra note 1, at 15-17 (discussing various economic
implications of bank failures).
4. See infra notes 82-90 and accompanying text.
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several years.5
This Note explores the underlying and central function of consolidated
supervision in international banking.6 Part I discusses international co-
ordination of bank supervision and provides a brief overview of the cur-
rent regulatory framework for supervising foreign banks operating in the
United States. Part II examines gaps in this regulatory framework, with
the BCCI scandal providing a particularly compelling example of the su-
pervisory difficulties inherent in regulating a modern global banking en-
tity. Part III suggests areas where reform is needed and analyzes several
legislative proposals from both Europe and the United States. Finally,
this Note concludes that problems in international banking arise from
the confusing and overlapping roles of national bank regulators, and
from a lack of any real ability to enforce bank compliance with regula-
tions-in other words, a lack of consolidated supervision.
I. CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK
The multinational nature of modem banking institutions raises ques-
tions about the ultimate supervisory authority over a bank's international
activities. Banking activities that occur outside banks' national borders
extend beyond the direct control of their national regulators.7 For exam-
ple, is the United States Government or the British Government respon-
sible for supervising the London branch of an American-chartered bank?
Similarly, which government should supervise the subsidiary of a British
bank located in New York? Answering these questions requires reaching
some consensus on the role of comprehensive supervision and interna-
tional cooperation in multinational bank regulation.
A. International Supervision of Banking Regulations
Increased concern with international cooperation in banking supervi-
sion, both in Europe and in the United States, began in 1974 when banks
from various countries experienced serious crises, including failure.' Af-
5. See Johnston, BCCI Agrees to Plead Guilty and Will Forfeit $550 Million, N.Y.
Times, Dec. 20, 1991, at Al, col. 1.
6. For definition and discussion of consolidated supervision, see infra notes 20-25
and accompanying text.
7. Nations exert control over the banking industry by creating a central bank and
other similar agencies. See infra note 9.
8. See Giusti, Banking Crises of the Early 1970s Demonstrated a Need for Coordi-
nated Supervision of International Finance, Am. Banker, Dec. 16, 1983, at 26. In the
U.S., the Franklin National Bank failed; it was the most notable of the bank failures
caused by the high inflation and interest rates of the early 1970s. See.Kotsopoulos,
Franklin National Bank, in A Case History of Bank Failures: 1971-1975, at 322 (1981).
Franklin National Bank, once the 20th largest bank in the U.S., closed on October 8,
1974, and was then the largest bank failure in U.S. history. See Rose, What Really Went
Wrong at Franklin National, Fortune, Oct. 1974, at 118.
The failure of a small domestic German bank, Herstatt Bank, caused strong ripple
effects on confidence in banks in other financial centers. See Cross-Border Banking, supra
note 1, at 113. These crises convinced banking regulators that different national banking
S468 [Vol. 60
BANKING SUPER VISION
ter these crises, each nation's central bank9 sought to create better coor-
dination of the surveillance activities exercised by national authorities."
To achieve this improved coordination, the central bank governors of the
Group of Ten major industrialized countries ("G-10")," together with
Switzerland and Luxembourg, met in Basle, Switzerland, in 1975. They
established the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory
Practices, commonly referred to as the Basle Committee. 2
The Basle Committee established closer cooperation among the super-
visory banking authorities-a development that eventually led to the
drafting of the first principles for international banking supervision. '3 In
1975 these principles were embodied in an agreement that became known
as "the Basle Concordat."' 4 Although the Concordat does not have the
force of law, it sets out the responsibilities for the supervision of banks
engaged in international business, and has become the cornerstone of co-
operation between national regulators in the supervision of these banks.'I
The central principle of the Basle Concordat of 1975 was that the su-
pervision of foreign banks should be the joint responsibility of the home
and host authority. 6 The Basle Committee agreed that, rather than cre-
ate a separate monitoring system operated by an international body,
common principles would be developed and implemented by the various
systems were truly interconnected, and pointed out an urgent need for cooperation
among banking regulators representing different nations. See id
9. See F. Mishkin, The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets 321
(1992). The central bank is the government agency that oversees the banking system and
is responsible for the conduct of monetary policy. See id
10. See U.S. Gen. Acct. Off., International Banking-International Coordination of
Bank Supervision: The Record to Date 14-15 (Feb. 1986) [hereinafter International
Coordination].
11. These are the ten major industrialized countries-Belgium, Canada, France, Ger-
many, Holland, Italy, Japan, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States--that
established the International Monetary Fund's General Agreement to Borrow in October
1962. See A. Mullineux, International Money and Banking: The Creation of a New
Order 66 n.4 (1987).
12. See International Coordination, supra note 10, at 14. The Committee is "the pri-
mary means through which bank supervisory officials from the major industrialized coun-
tries can exchange ideas and reach agreements in supervising the foreign establishments
and other international activities of financial institutions." Id
13. See Giusti, supra note 8, at 26.
14. See International Coordination, supra note 10, at 17; Committee on Banking Reg-
ulations and Supervisory Practicesr The 'Basle Concordat' in Legal Issues of Cross-Border
Banking, supra note 1, at 133-40 [hereinafter Basle Text] (reprints the 1983 Basle
Concordat).
15. See Cross-Border Banking, supra note 1, at 113. The Concordat does not consti-
tute a formal agreement, and it has no force in law. Hence, the use of the word 'concor-
dat,' which in public law refers to "[a] compact, covenant, or convention between two or
more independent governments." Black's Law Dictionary 290 (6th ed. 1990).
16. See Mendelsohn, New Basel Concordat: Main Deficiency is Intact, Am. Banker,
June 16, 1983, at 2. A bank's headquarters are located in its "home country" and are
supervised by a home or parent authority. An overseas office of the bank is located in the
"host country" and may be directly subject to the regulatory standard of the host coun-
try's supervising authority. See International Coordination, supra note 10, at 19.
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nations.17
In 1983, in response to several gaps in the 1975 Concordat, and in
reaction to yet another banking scandal,"8 the original Concordat was
revised and a new Concordat approved.19 The 1983 Concordat intro-
duced two regulatory precepts that together constitute the foundation for
the principle of consolidated supervision.2° First, the adequacy of super-
visory standards within national jurisdictions was ensured by adopting a
"dual key" approach in which home and host authorities assess the qual-
ity of one another's supervision.2 If a host country believes that a par-
ent's supervision of foreign banks in its territory is inadequate, the host
country should prohibit or discourage the continued operation of these
offices.22 Second, the home authority was required to take primary re-
sponsibility for supervising the operations of banks incorporated in its
country on a worldwide basis, including foreign subsidiaries.2 3
The 1983 Basle Concordat states that "banking supervisory authorities
cannot be fully satisfied about the soundness of individual banks unless
they can examine the totality of each bank's business worldwide through
the technique of consolidation."24 The Concordat further explains that
"[t]he principle of consolidated supervision is that parent banks and par-
ent supervisory authorities monitor the risk exposure.., of the banks or
banking groups for which they are responsible, as well as the adequacy of
their capital, on the basis of the totality of their business wherever con-
ducted."25 In short, the idea is that overall supervision and enforcement
of bank regulations should be strengthened by having home authorities
supervise activities on the basis of a bank's global operations.
The intention of the Basle Committee was to prevent banks from grav-
itating toward the least-regulated jurisdictions and thereby perpetuating
the resulting competition in regulatory laxity between financial centers
17. See Giusti, supra note 8, at 26. The hope was that the Concordat would enable
national officials to work with and understand the different practices of supervisory agen-
cies, eventually finding practical ways of aligning legislation in the G-10. See id.
18. In 1982, an Italian bank, Banco Ambrosiano, further demonstrated the need for
consolidated supervision. The Bank of Italy had assumed responsibility for rescuing Am-
brosiano's Italian operations, but declined to take any responsibility for the failure of the
group's operations outside Italy, especially those in Luxembourg and South America.
See Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 2. Luxembourg, however, disclaimed responsibility
for Banco Ambrosiano's Luxembourg subsidiary. See Dale, Someone Must Be In Charge,
Fin. Times, July 22, 1991, at 12, col. 3.
19. See Giusti, supra note 8, at 26.
20. See Basle Text, supra note 14, at 135.
21. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 3.
22. See id. In addition, if the parent authority believes that the host authority's su-
pervision is inadequate, it should "either extend its supervision, to the degree that is
practicable, or it should be prepared to discourage the parent bank from continuing to
operate the establishment in question." Id.
23. See id.
24. Basle Text, supra note 14, at 133.
25. Id. at 136.
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competing for foreign banking business.26 In order to ensure that the
supervisory standards are aligned with those of the most stringently reg-
ulated centers, however, national authorities must also be prepared to
lock out foreign banks that originate in permissive jurisdictions."
For several reasons, however, the 1983 Basle Concordat did not prove
to be a magic solution to the problem of international bank regulation.
First, in a provision that has proven controversial, the Concordat al-
lowed for an exception to the consolidation principle. It stated that
"[w]here holding companies are at the head of groups that include sepa-
rately incorporated banks operating in different countries," there is no
requirement for home supervision of the institution as a whole.2" This
provision has left a void in home-country responsibility for those banks
that fall under the exception. Second, while over eighty nations agreed
to adhere to the principles of the 1983 Concordat, not until very recently
did any of the signatories in fact begin to implement its proposals.2 9 In-
deed, the European Community ("EC") has just called for consolidated
action both in supervising institutions3" and in harmonizing the contents
of published accounts of banks3" as part of its goal of a single market by
the end of 1992. This kind of delay has potentially allowed even more
banks to operate without proper supervision.
B. Supervisory Structure in the United States
The regulatory structure in the United States governing domestic
26. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 3. Therefore, "each national supervisory au-
thority must satisfy itself that banks' foreign operations are being conducted in jurisdic-
tions with sound supervisory practices and that foreign banks to which it is host are
subject to adequate supervision in their home jurisdiction." Id
27. See id; see also Basle Text, supra note 14, at 135 (host authority "should be pre-
pared to discourage the parent bank from continuing to operate the establishment in
question"). For example, in the U.S., Manhattan District Attorney Robert Morgenthau,
during his investigation of BCCI, has called for legislation that would "'say to foreign
banks that you can't do business in the U.S. unless you are regulated by a strong central
bank and there are no bank secrecy laws in your country.'" Fed Hits BCCI With $200
Million Penalty as N.Y. Grand Jury Hands Down Indictments, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA)
No. 6, at 210 (Aug. 5, 1991).
28. Basle Text, supra note 14, at 136. BCCI was structured as a holding company as
a way to minimize regulatory constraints. It is precisely those banks, however, that are
seeking to avoid regulatory attention that need to be supervised most closely. See infra
notes 82-88 and accompanying text.
29. See Crass-Border Banking, supra note 1, at 114 n.9. For example, the G-10 Gov-
ernors have agreed that the Basle Committee's proposals on capital adequacy should be
implemented by 1992. See id
30. See Council Directive 83/350 of 13 June 1983 on the Supervision of Credit Insti-
tutions on a Consolidated Basis, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18. The aim of this directive is to
establish the "principle that supervision of a credit institution operating in several Mem-
ber states is provided by the competent authorities of the Member state in which the head
office of the credit institution is situated." 1992-Planning for Financial Services and the
Insurance Sector 46 (1989) [hereinafter 1992-Financial Services].
31. See Council Directive 86/635 of 8 December 1986, 1986 O.J. (L 372). "The di-
rective prescribes the same layout, nomenclature and terminology for balance sheets of all
credit institutions in the Community." 1992-Financial Services, supra note 30, at 48.
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banks evolved haphazardly as a series of reactions to and "fixes" of finan-
cial crises.3 2 The regulatory structure for foreign banks operating in the
United States has evolved in a similar way, with foreign banks often try-
ing to circumvent regulations aimed at amending problems in the domes-
tic or foreign banking system that would effectively render American
banks uncompetitive.33 Currently the regulation and supervision of for-
eign banks operating in the United States are the shared responsibility of
three federal agencies: the Federal Reserve Board ("Fed"),34 the Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC"),35 and the Federal Deposit
32. For example, problems related to the Civil War led to the enactment of the Act of
June 3, 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 1865 (1988)) [here-
inafter National Bank Act of 1864]. See Note, Too Many Consonants and Not Enough
Consonance: The Development of the S&L Regulatory Framework, in Annual Survey of
Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59
Fordham L. Rev. 5263, S265-66 (1991) [hereinafter Too Many Consonants]. Recurring
bank crises from 1873 to 1907 led to the Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913)
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 221-226 (1988) and other various sections). See id.
The Great Depression led to the Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162, (codified at 12
U.S.C., distributed throughout chapters 2,3 and 6). The Depository Institutions Deregu-
lation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (codified at
various sections of 12 U.S.C. (1988)) was aimed at the problems in the thrift industry as
was the Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320,
§ 202B, 96 Stat. 1469 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1811 (1988)). For a detailed discussion
about the reactive nature of Savings and Loan legislation in this country, see generally N.
Lash, Banking Laws and Regulations: An Economic Perspective 1-21 (1987) (discussing
the history of U.S. banking legislation); Too Many Consonants, supra, at S263 (same).
33. See D. Khambata, The Practice of Multinational Banking 35 (1986) [hereinafter
Multinational Banking]. Regulations for foreign banks in the U.S. were reactions to the
enormous increase in the foreign banking presence in the U.S., see id. at 47, not necessar-
ily to financial crises. Regulators were also concerned about any preferential treatment
that foreign banks might be receiving. See S. Rep. No. 1073, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1421, 1421-22 [hereinafter IBA Leg-
islative History].
34. The National Monetary Commission of 1908 proposed the creation of a central
banking system to oversee the monetary and credit functions of the nation's financial
system. See S. Rep. No. 243, 62d Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1912). As finally enacted into law,
this central banking system was also charged with related supervisory duties. See Federal
Reserve Act, supra note 32, § 11, 38 Stat. at 261-62 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 248 (1988)).
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 created a system of twelve federal reserve banks, each
acting, in effect, as a central bank for its geographical region and overseen by the Board
of Governors of the Fed located in Washington. See id. § 2, 38 Stat. at 251-52 (codified
as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 222 (1988)). The member banks of the Fed include all na-
tional banks, as required by law, and those state-chartered banks that have chosen to
apply and who have received membership in the federal system. See id. §§ 2, 9, 38 Stat.
at 251-52, 259 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 222, 321 (1988)).
The Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation is primarily responsible for the
coordination and oversight of the supervisory activities of the Fed and for examination
procedures of the Reserve Banks. See Rules of Organization of Federal Reserve System,
51 Fed. Reg. 42,935 (1986); see also 1 M. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks, § 1.3.2,
at 40-47 (1988) (discussing the general structure of the Federal Reserve System).
35. The Comptroller of the Currency is the oldest federal bank regulatory institution
still in existence. Today, the Comptroller functions as the administrator of those banks
chartered by him under the National Bank Act and is responsible for the administration
of virtually all federal laws applicable to national banks. See Malloy, supra note 34,
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Insurance Corporation ("FDIC").36 These agencies are charged with
monitoring foreign branch activity in the United States and assuring
sound banking practices and management.
37
Supervision of foreign banks operating in the United States poses par-
ticular problems because of the dual nature of the American banking
system. 38 Under the dual system, the licensing, regulation, and supervi-
sion of banks, both domestic and international, fall under the aegis of
both state and federal governments,39 and is, indeed, a source of conten-
tion.' The Federal Reserve Act of 191341 and the Banking Act of
193342 provided for the Federal Government to regulate foreign banks
participating in the state banking system.43 The Federal Government is
responsible for formulating national monetary policy and therefore has
§ 1.3.1, at 28-40. "The approval of the Comptroller is required for practically any signifi-
cant action to be taken by a national bank, including chartering, establishment of
branches, changes in corporate control, or in the structure of the organization." Id. Ad-
ditionally, the Comptroller has supervisory authority over the day-to-day activities of
national banks. See id
A national bank is defined as a bank, chartered by an official of the Federal Govern-
ment, that is subject to federal law regarding its corporate structure, powers and the like,
although it is still subject to state law for its day-to-day operations. See id. at 31-32 &
n.19.
36. See Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 44. The primary statutory mandate
of the FDIC is to provide deposit insurance to all banks qualifying for insurance coverage
under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1814(b) (1988). See Multinational
Banking, supra note 33, at 44; see also Baker, supra note 1, at 81-82 (the FDIC "would
assure that depositors in virtually all banking institutions in the United States would be
covered by insurance"). See generally Malloy, supra note 34, § 1.3.3, at 47-52 (discussing
the general structure of the FDIC).
37. See Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 46.
38. The dual banking system dates back to the beginning of banking in this country.
It was not until 1819 that the Supreme Court established the right of the Federal Govern-
ment to create and operate a system of banks. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316, 325-26 (1819). When the Act of February 25, 1863, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665
[hereinafter the National Currency Act of 1863], which was later repealed by the Na-
tional Bank Act of 1864, supra note 32, § 62, 13 Stat. at 118, was passed to finance the
Civil War, Congress provided for a co-equal system of national banks regulated by fed-
eral agencies, and state banks regulated and supervised by state banking authorities. See
Malloy, supra note 34, § 1.3.1, at 28-30.
39. See Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 36. This duality is a result of the
principle that states have the right to manage and control activities within their borders,
and that the Federal Government has the right to manage national fiscal and monetary
policy. See idL
40. Consider, for instance, the circumstance of a state-chartered bank that is insured
by the FDIC and is a member of the Federal Reserve System. This institution is under
the authority and jurisdiction of three distinct and independent regulators: the state
chartering authority, the FDIC, and the Fed. See Malloy, supra note 34, § 1.3, at 23.
For a detailed discussion of the division of labor, see Lash, supra note 32, at 27-35.
41. See Federal Reserve Act, supra note 32, § 25, 38 Stat. at 273 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 601-04, 611-31 (1988)).
42. See Banking Act of 1933, supra note 32, § 21, 48 Stat. at 189 (codified as amended
at 12 U.S.C. § 378 (1988)).
43. See generally Considine, A State's Response to the United States Treasury Depart-
ment Proposals to Modernize the Nation's Banking System, in Annual Survey of Financial
Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L.
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distinct interests in maintaining a principal position in bank regulation.'
Additionally, the Federal Government, through the FDIC, is the "lender
of last resort,"45 guaranteeing payment of insured deposits at failed
institutions.46
The Fed's authority and responsibility for supervising the U.S. opera-
tions of foreign banks derive primarily from the Bank Holding Company
Act ("BHCA")47 and the International Banking Act of 1978 ("IBA"). 4s
The BHCA regulates the acquisition of American bank holding compa-
nies by foreign banks and the IBA controls the operation of foreign
banks in the United States.49
The BHCA conferred on the Fed the power to regulate overseas affili-
ates of American banks, foreign branches of American banks, and all
foreign banks operating in the United States with consolidated assets
Rev. S243, S244-45 (1991) (the Fed, FDIC, and OCC were given supervisory powers
over federal and state banks' foreign banking activities).
44. Under the Federal Reserve Act of 1913, the Fed became the central bank of the
U.S., thus making the Fed responsible for national monetary policy. See Federal Reserve
Act, supra note 32, § 2, 38 Stat. at 251-52 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 222
(1988)). Because banking activities are a key ingredient to monetary policy and help the
government maintain the overall stability of the economy, the Fed seeks a primary role in
bank regulation. See Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 36.
45. See Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 36. In times of crisis, the Fed will
act to maintain the stability and health of the banking system by advancing credit to
solvent but temporarily illiquid financial institutions. Through this role, the Fed has the
duty to impose prudential measures designed to ensure the soundness of the system and
to monitor and examine banks to ensure compliance and to identify problems before they
become too severe. See generally Mishkin, supra note 9, at 452-61 (discussing the pro-
gression of federal regulation measures).
46. See Malloy, supra note 34, § 1.3.3, at 48. For instance, the Fed has indicated that
it will not allow the collapse of two banks associated with BCCI: First American of
Washington, D.C., and Independence Bank of Encino, California. See Lohr, 2 Banks
Tied to BCCI Get Aid From a Worried Federal Reserve, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1991, at A1,
col. 5. The Independence case highlights the machinations of the dual U.S. system. In-
dependence is a state chartered bank and its principal Federal overseer is the FDIC, yet
the Fed is leading the effort to bail out the bank. See id.; see also infra notes 106-111 and
accompanying text (discussing the problems of the dual U.S. banking system).
47. See Bank Holding Company Act, ch. 240, 70 Stat. 133 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 1841-49 (1988)) [hereinafter BHCA]. The BHCA was passed to regulate the
process by which banks were using holding companies to expand and acquire additional
banks and to engage in non-banking business. See S. Rep. No. 1095, 84th Cong., 2d Sess.
1, reprinted in 1956 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 2482. Following the enactment of
the BHCA, bank holding companies had to obtain approval by the Fed before acquiring a
voting share in excess of 5% of a bank or company, and state law had to permit the
investment. See BHCA, supra, § 3(a)(3), 70 Stat. at 134 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1842(a)(3) (1988)). Bank holding companies were also prohibited from acquir-
ing a bank outside the bank's principal state of operations unless the state permitted it.
See id.
48. International Banking Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-369, 92 Stat. 607 (codified at
12 U.S.C. §§ 3101-08 (1988)) [hereinafter IBA].
49. See R. Pecchioli, The Internationalisation of Banking 76 (1983). A bank holding
company is defined as "[a] corporation that owns, controls, or otherwise has the power to
vote at least 25 percent of the voting stock in one or more banks." E. Compton, Princi-
ples of Banking 371 (1988).
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greater than one billion dollars. 50 Through the BHCA, the Fed also has
residual authority to conduct special investigations of all foreign banks
under state supervision.5 1 Additionally, the BHCA gave the OCC and
the FDIC some supervisory functions over foreign banks. 2
The importance of the Fed's functions have increased with the growth
of global banking entities. There is an overwhelming need for a primary
and definitive authority to regulate the often byzantine character of inter-
national banking transactions.5 3 Before Congress passed the IBA, for-
eign banks present in the United States were primarily regulated and
supervised by state regulatory authorities.' Moreover, foreign banks
were generally permitted to establish or acquire bank subsidiaries under
either federal or state law, and to establish branches or agencies under
state law.5 5 Indeed, foreign banks generally preferred state regulation
because, by avoiding many of the federal restrictions applicable to do-
mestic banking institutions,56 foreign banks could provide more competi-
50. See IBA, supra note 48, § 7(a)(1)(B)(2), 92 Stat. at 620 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 3105(a)(1)(B)(2) (1988)).
51. See id § 7(c)(1), 92 Stat. at 621 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3105(b)(1)
(1988)).
52. The OCC supervises all national banks with assets of over SlO billion, all national
banks with overseas branches, and federally chartered foreign branches and agencies in
the U.S. See Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 45. The OCC shares with the
states the supervision of non-federally insured state-chartered foreign branches. See id
FDIC deposit insurance and assessments are mandatory for essentially all domestic
banks, and for federal and state branches of foreign banks that receive any significant
level of retail deposits of less than $100,000. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 28.8, 346.4(a), 346.8
(1991). For a discussion of the federal and state banking systems, see supra notes 38-43
and accompanying text. The FDIC conducts examinations of the activities of insured
banks on the basis of "safety and soundness" considerations. See Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 207, 103 Stat.
183, 206 (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1816 (1988)); Note, A Note to Congress and the FDIC
After FIRREA, Where's the BIF?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regula-
tion, The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S41 1, S413-14
(1991).
53. See infra notes 73-146 and accompanying text.
54. See IBA Legislative History, supra note 33, at 1426.
55. See Carr, Jr. & More, Developments in the Regulation of Foreign Bank Operations
in the United States, 1988 U. Ill. L. Rev. 225, 228. A foreign bank's offices can take
several forms. Most closely linked to a parent bank are its "branches." These units have
no separate legal identity; they are mere extensions of the parent bank in foreign loca-
tions. Branches are defined by the IBA as "any office or any place of business of a foreign
bank located in any State of the United States at which deposits are received." IBA,
supra note 48, § 1(b)(3), 92 Stat. at 607 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3101(3)
(1988)). Closely related to branches are "agencies." An agency is "any office or any
place of business of a foreign bank located in any State of the United States at which
credit balances are maintained ... checks are paid, or money is lent but at which deposits
may not be accepted from citizens or residents of the United States." Id. § l(b)(1), 92
Stat. at 607 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3101(1) (1988)). Parent banks may also
operate overseas through "subsidiaries." These independent institutions, in which the
parent bank has a total or partial interest, are incorporated in the country in which they
operate. See Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 27.
56. For example, before the enactment of the IBA many foreign banks engaged in
rapid multistate expansion because states, in an effort to encourage investment in their
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tive services than domestic banks."
With most foreign banks opting for state regulation, Congress enacted
the IBA in 1978. The Act responded to problems such as the lack of
federal supervision over most foreign bank operations in the United
States, the rapid growth of such operations, and the expansion of foreign
banks' operations into the domestic retail-deposit market.58 The IBA es-
tablished a new regulatory framework to govern the American opera-
tions of foreign banks. The central premises of this framework were the
policy of "national treatment" and increased federal supervisory powers
over foreign banks.59 The IBA established, for the first time, statutory
federal jurisdiction over the U.S. operations of foreign banks." The IBA
also amended previously "domestic-only" laws and regulations, such as
the BHCA, to include foreign banks.61
The enactment of the IBA gave foreign banks the option, similar to
domestic banks, to establish a banking office in the U.S. by obtaining
either a federal license from the OCC or a license from the appropriate
state regulator.62 But to provide the mechanism for consolidated super-
vision over such a dual banking structure, Congress determined that
states, permitted the entry of foreign banks into their state, irrespective of whether the
bank had facilities in other states. Domestic banks, though, are prohibited from organiz-
ing full-service banking entities in more than one state. See IBA Legislative History,
supra note 33, at 1427.
57. See International Banking Act of 1978. Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Finan-
cial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 46 (1978) [herein-
after IBA Senate Hearings]. Before the enactment of the IBA there were many
complaints that foreign banks present in the U.S. had competitive advantages over do-
mestic institutions regardless of whether the foreign banks were federally or state-
chartered. See id.
Specifically, unlike domestic banks, "foreign banks could cross state lines, engage in
nonbanking activities, hold equity in U.S. securities firms, benefit from lower capitaliza-
tion requirements, ignore federal reserve requirements and interest rate ceilings, and de-
cline FDIC insurance and related assessments." Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at
40. Thus, not only did foreign banks have more business latitude, but they could offer
their banking services at a cheaper rate because they were not burdened by Federal regu-
lations. See id.
58. See IBA Senate Hearings, supra note 57, at 46. The Fed was concerned about the
status of foreign banks not only because of the disparate treatment caused by varying
state laws, but also because its inability to control their reserves made it very difficult to
implement federal monetary policy that relies on management of reserves. See Baker,
supra note 1, at 83-85.
59. An underlying principle of national treatment is "parity of treatment between
foreign and domestic banks in like circumstances." IBA Legislative History, supra note
33, at 1422.
60. See IBA, supra note 48, §§ 7-13, 92 Stat. at 620-25 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3105-08 (1988)).
61. The IBA recognized the different banking structures that foreign banks are per-
mitted to operate by their home countries. As a result, under § 8(a) of the IBA, foreign
banks are treated as bank holding companies for the purposes of the non-banking restric-
tions of the BHCA, but are not actually required to establish separate holding companies.
See IBA, supra note 48, § 8(a), 92 Stat. at 622 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3106(a) (1988)).
62. See Carr, Jr. & More, supra note 55, at 238.
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there should be one agency responsible for overseeing all U.S. operations
of foreign banks.63 The Fed was given this umbrella supervisory author-
ity.' The main areas of concern for the Fed relate to: (1) the entry of
foreign banking institutions into the American market;65 (2) the applica-
tion of regulations to the foreign banks;" and (3) the extent of supervi-
sion and examination.
The Fed has exercised its supervisory authority under the IBA by es-
tablishing a regular reporting system that covers all of the American
banking operations of foreign banks. The Fed also works with the other
state and federal supervisors to set examination standards, and it reviews
all examination reports of branches and agencies.6 Further, the Fed has
established a common examination format and has attempted to ensure
that each foreign branch or agency is examined at least once every eight-
een months.6" The Fed, in its capacity as the central bank, also obtains
information on the financial condition of the parent bank, meets regu-
larly with the management of the foreign banks operating in the United
States, and acts as an enforcer when necessary.6 9
Nevertheless, despite the Fed's development of its own internal exami-
nation format, Congress has instructed the Fed to rely "insofar as possi-
ble" upon the examinations conducted by the OCC, the FDIC, or the
appropriate state licensing authority-an instruction that actually works
63. See id.
64. See IBA, supra note 48, § 7(a), 92 Stat. at 620 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3105(a) (1988)).
65. Because of the dual banking system, foreign banks were still able to choose be-
tween state and federal chartering. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text. The
IBA, however, did close some doors by making entry of certain types of banking institu-
tions a federal responsibility. For example, foreign banks cannot acquire domestic banks
in more than one state, although they can still establish branches and agencies in more
than one state. See IBA, supra note 48, § 4, 92 Stat- at 610 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 3102 (1988)).
The following areas are now subject to federal approval: "acquisition of national or
state banks, establishment of federal or state branches and agencies, and formation of an
investment company." Multinational Banking, supra note 33, at 48.
66. Subject to certain exemptions, foreign banking institutions must meet capitaliza-
tion and federal reserve requirements and adhere to ceilings on interest rates. See IBA.
supra note 48, § 4(g), 92 Stat. at 611 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3102(g) (1988)).
Again, with certain exemptions, foreign banking institutions must have FDIC insurance
for retail deposits. See id. § 6, 92 Stat. at 614 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3104
(1988)).
67. See 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 1032 (1990). As stated by William Taylor, Staff Director,
Division of Banking Supervision and Regulation,
[t]he Federal Reserve receives and reviews all examination reports conducted
by the other federal and state bank supervisors. It collects and analyzes quar-
terly reports of condition and reports on foreign credit exposure from all
branches and agencies of foreign banks. Through these and other means, the
Federal Reserve tracks the condition of all U.S. offices of a foreign bank to
assess the foreign bank's performance on a nationwide basis.
Id at 1033. The examiners also rely on internal and external auditors. See id. at 1034.
68. See id. at 1033.
69. See id.
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to limit the Fed's power.7' As a result, the role of the Fed in both the
examination and supervision process varies from state to state.7 ' Its role
depends on such factors as the "importance of foreign banks in a particu-
lar state, the examination resources of the states, and the experience of
the states in this area.",72 Thus, the potential for inconsistent and inexact
supervision still exists even though one entity is technically responsible
for oversight.
II. REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY PROBLEMS: A LACK OF
CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISION
As the banking issues discussed in the preceding section demonstrate,
the growth in the overseas presence of banks has complicated the work of
bank regulators and supervisors. Indeed, the problems facing banking
regulators stem precisely from national regulators and supervisors not
performing their functions properly, or simply not knowing what their
duties are.73 This confusion, in turn, contributes to and compounds the
underlying problem in international banking-lack of consolidated
supervision.
When an institution operates internationally in multiple jurisdictions
with differing laws and regulations, review and supervision of all of the
institution's components provide the only means of determining the true
financial condition of the institution and the extent and lawfulness of its
operations.74 With no real possibility of a uniform international banking
law, the only means of assuring uniform standards of bank supervision is
through international cooperation and coordination.75
As the BCCI scandal shows, the costs of inadequate international co-
operation in this area can be enormous. BCCI was engaged in four major
frauds. One was a cover-up of $633 million of losses on treasury trad-
70. See IBA, supra note 48, § 7(c)(1), 92 Stat. at 621 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 3105(b)(1) (1988)).
71. See 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 1032, 1033 (1990).
72. Id. at 1033. For example, in some states where there is a very small foreign bank-
ing presence, there is no direct Fed participation in the examination process. See id. In
California and Texas, the Federal Reserve Banks of San Francisco and of Dallas, respec-
tively, share the examination workload with the state banking authority. See id. In New
York, however, the examinations are conducted almost entirely by the state. See id.
73. See infra notes 127-41 and accompanying text.
74. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 3.
75. The Basle Concordat stresses the need for cooperation, stating that:
Adequate supervision of banks' foreign establishments calls not only for an ap-
propriate allocation of responsibilities between parent and host supervisory au-
thorities but also for contact and co-operation between them. It has been, and
remains, one of the Committee's principal purposes to foster such co-operation
both among its member countries and more widely. The Committee has been
encouraged by the like-minded approach of other groups of supervisors and it
hopes to continue to strengthen its relationships with these other groups and to
develop new ones.
Basle Text, supra note 14, at 133.
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ing.76 The second was the illegal acquisition of several banks in the U.S.,
on which it spent $346 million.77 The third was spending $725 million in
a complex manipulation of accounts to support its largest borrower. 8
The fourth was BCCI leveraging itself by allegedly acquiring secret con-
trol of 56% of its own shares at a cost of over $500 million.79 Addition-
ally, BCCI spent about $2 billion to cover up its fraud, bringing the total
bill to over $4 billion.8° According to William Taylor, Staff Director of
the Fed's Division of Banking Regulation and Supervision, "[N]o one
country had a clear view of the BCCI's worldwide activities or the re-
sponsibility to supervise the company on a consolidated basis."', That,
indeed, is the problem.
Using the BCCI scandal 2 as an illustration of what can happen when
adequate supervision is absent, the following section discusses several
reasons for the existing lack of consolidated supervision-including large
banking structures, deficient home-country supervision, national sover-
eignty concerns, bank secrecy laws and, in the U.S., the dual nature of
the banking system.
A. Barriers to Consolidated Supervision
1. Large Banking Structures
As the BCCI debacle shows, large banking structures pose particular
76. See Lascelles, The Biggest Bank Fraud in History, Fin. Times, Nov. 9, 1991, at 1,
cols. 3-4.
77. See id
78. See id
79. See id
80. See id
81. 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 569, 571 (1991).
82. In a global operation on July 5, 1991, authorities of the Bank of England, along
with the U.S., Luxembourg, the Cayman Islands, Switzerland, Spain, Canada, France
and Argentina closed most of the operations of BCCI because of evidence of widespread
fraud, including fraudulent concealment of losses from its lending and trading operations.
See Kraus & Evans, BCCI Assets Are Seized in 8 Nations" Fraud Cited, Am. Banker, July
8, 1991, at 1.
Luxembourg seized control over the assets of BCCI S.A. Luxembourg, two Cayman
Island affiliates were seized by that Island's inspector of banks, and the New York State
Banking Department took control of the New York City agency of BCCI. See Interna-
tional Authorities Seize Control of BCCI, After Evidence of Major Fraud, 57 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 3, at 119 (July 15, 1991). A Bank of England official stated that "regulators
acted after a report completed by Price Waterhouse on June 27 showed evidence of wide-
spread fraud at BCCI." Id
BCCI began closing its offices in several other countries around the world. In Japan,
BCCI's Tokyo branch closed temporarily. See Evans, More BCC[ Offices Closed; US
Exposure Called Small, Am. Banker, July 9, 1991, at 9. BCCI ceased operations in Sri
Lanka, in Seoul, South Korea, and in Nicosia, Cyprus. See id Germany froze the bank
accounts at BCCI's two German branches; authorities in Hong Kong closed BCCI's sub-
sidiary; and the Netherlands closed the BCCI office in Amsterdam. See id BCCI's three
branches in Pakistan remained open. See id According to the Bank of England, the
coordinating regulator, eighteen other countries were cooperating to shut BCCI's opera-
tions. See id
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supervisory nightmares. Founded in the early 1970s in Pakistan by a
group of Arab investors, BCCI became, in every respect, a global bank. 3
At its height, BCCI was the seventh-largest private bank in the world,
with capital of $1.5 billion and assets worth twenty billion dollars.8 4
Through a network of subsidiaries, affiliates, and branches, BCCI oper-
ated in seventy-three countries, with most of its banking offices located in
Europe, Africa, the Middle East, the Caribbean, and South America.8"
The holding company for these entities, BCCI Holdings, was chartered
in Luxembourg. 6 Two major subsidiaries of the BCCI Holdings, BCCI
S.A. in Luxembourg and BCCI Overseas in the Cayman Islands,87 oper-
ated agencies in the U.S. that were licensed by California, Florida, and
New York. 8
The activities of BCCI and its affiliates demonstrate that those running
the bank had a clear and distinct objective to exploit its complex struc-
ture in order to evade as many regulatory and supervisory authorities as
possible.8 9 The very nature of a large modern corporate entity raises an
inherent concern of fractioned supervision. The potential for deception,
coupled with an intent to deceive, is ominous. Indeed, public awareness
of BCCI and its nefarious deeds is now quite high, and its initials,
"BCCI," have become synonymous with financial crime and
83. See Lascelles, BCCI, Behind Closed Doors; 'This Bank Would Bribe God', Fin.
Times, Nov. 11, 1991, at 7, col. 3.
84. See Donkin, Four European Central Banks Are Monitoring BCCI Dealings, Fin.
Times, Oct. 18, 1988, at 28, col. 3.
85. See BCCI: Till Drugs Do Us Part, Economist, Oct. 15, 1988, at 96. BCCI's
businesses ranged from seemingly respectable European banks to mysterious offshore in-
vestment companies and arms trading. For a detailed discussion of these dubious activi-
ties, see Beaty & Gwynne, Not Just a Bank,- You Can Get Anything You Want Through
BCCI-Guns, Planes, Even Nuclear-Weapons Technology, Time, Sept. 2, 1991, at 56
[hereinafter Not Just a Bank].
86. See BCCI: Till Drugs Do Us Part, supra note 85, at 96.
87. See id.
88. See Schmalz, Bank is Charged by U.S. With Money-Laundering, N.Y. Times, Oct
12, 1988, at D6, col. 6. Agency operations are limited by law, and, therefore, the BCCI
offices in the U.S. were not allowed to accept consumer deposits, nor were they able to
offer insured deposits of any kind. See IBA, supra note 48, § 4(d), 92 Stat. at 611 (codi-
fied as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3102(d) (1988)). BCCI's U.S. agencies in Los Angeles
and New York had a total of about $240 million in assets. See BCCI Assets Are Seized,
supra note 82, at 1.
89. See Maremont, The Long and Winding Road to BCCI's Dead End, Bus. Wk., July
22, 1991, at 54. The Financial Times describes the situation as follows:
At the peak, the auditors had about 300 people around the world trying to
reassemble 32,000 separate transactions going back over 10 years. It was a gi-
ant hall of mirrors; money that didn't exist, money that did exist but was stolen,
customers who didn't exist, customers who did exist but denied their loans,
money that went round in circles, money that vanished and money that popped
up out of nowhere.
Lascelles, BCCI Behind Closed Doors; 'The Final Hours', Fin. Times, Nov. 16, 1991, at 4,
cols. 4-5.
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corruption.90
2. Lack of Home-Country Supervision
It is vital to international banking that any foreign bank entering any
nation be subject to comprehensive supervision on a consolidated basis
by a home-country regulator.9 ' Indeed, the core of the consolidated su-
pervision principle requires the home country to provide adequate super-
vision.92 Where this does not occur, problems will arise, as demonstrated
by the failure of authorities in BCCI's home country to subject the insti-
tution to a comprehensive system of supervisory oversight.93
Both the holding company for BCCI and one of its major banking
subsidiaries were chartered in Luxembourg.94 But neither of these BCCI
entities actually conducted business in that country, which meant that
under then-existing Luxembourg law, the regulatory authorities in Lux-
embourg were not required to supervise BCCI's global operations.9" Be-
cause there was no home supervision, each separate BCCI affiliate
around the world was monitored individually without a complete under-
standing of how the affiliate's local activities fit within the whole BCCI
organization.9 6 In other words, no one regulatory authority was watch-
ing "the big picture."
90. "Bank for Check-Kiting Congressional Incumbents," is an example. See On Lan-
guage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1991, § 6 (Magazine), at 18, col. 1.
91. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 3; see also supra notes 20-25 and accompany-
ing text (discussing consolidated supervision).
92. See Basle Text, supra note 14, at 135-36.
93. One key reason BCCI was able to get away with criminal activities was because
"it was careful never to develop a home country base where it would be subjected to the
full scrutiny of the local banking authority." Lascelles, First Steps Towards Tougher Reg-
ulation, Fin. Times, Sept. 2, 1991, at 13, col. 1. BCCI's banking operations were split
between two main subsidiaries incorporated in different jurisdictions-Luxembourg and
the Cayman Islands. This structure ruled out consolidated supervision. See id. at 13,
cols. 2-3.
94. See BCCL Regulatory Rights and Wrongs, Fm. Reg. Rep., July, 1991, at 1-2.
95. See First Steps Towards Tougher Regulation, supra note 93, at 13. The relevant
Luxembourg law was changed in 1982 and 1984 and, according to Luxembourg Prime
Minister, Jacques Santer, these new laws "are capable of preventing the future establish-
ment of banks structured similar to BCCI." Luxembourg Will Not Adopt Stricter Bank-
ing Rules In Wake of BCCI Scandal, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 5, at 197 (July 29,
1991). Indeed, Pierre Jaans, the director of the Luxembourg Monetary Institute, "ex-
plained that the Institute recently asked a bank to move its official headquarters out of
Luxembourg because its international activities were much more active than its local
operations," which was precisely the situation with BCCI. See id at 197-98.
96. When the BCCI branch in Tampa was convicted of drug-money laundering in the
U.S. in 1988, the Bank of England conducted a thorough investigation of BCCI's British
branches but found nothing abnormal. See First Steps Towards Tougher Regulation,
supra note 93, at 13, col. 2. This suggests that BCCI was adept at keeping its questiona-
ble activities out of the more closely supervised countries. The Bank of England was,
however, the regulator that did eventually lead the closure of BCCI's global operations in
the summer of 1991. See id
1992] S481
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
3. National Sovereignty Issues and Differences in Supervisory
Standards
Adequate supervision can also be hindered by the differences in the
supervisory standards of the home and host supervisory agencies. 97 In-
deed, for competitive advantage, many banks actually seek those loca-
tions promising minimum supervision.9"
Under the principle of consolidated supervision, home supervisors are
encouraged and often required to broaden the scope of their supervision
to include the foreign offices of domestic institutions.99 Any attempt,
however, to exert complete control over these foreign offices raises na-
tional sovereignty issues. This is especially true when the foreign office
operates as a subsidiary, since subsidiaries have a legally independent
standing in the host country.'°° Nations are also reluctant to share or
delegate authority regarding banks domiciled in their borders because of
the correlation between bank security and national monetary policy."10
4. Bank Secrecy Laws
As cross-border banking increased, international banking centers be-
gan competing for the banks' business. Some countries sought to attract
business by implementing an array of bank secrecy laws, : 2 which lure
banks by attracting a large amount of private deposits from clients who
prefer to keep their money away from the interfering eyes of their gov-
ernments. BCCI appears to have considered this when it set up its major
subsidiaries in Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands-both offshore
havens for companies wishing to maintain secrecy. 103
97. Problems will also arise due to jurisdictional issues, and due to the fact that na-
tions have different ways of characterizing banking transactions. See F. Ryder, Legal
Problems in International Banking 3-6 (1987).
98. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 7; Kuttner, Controlling the Climate That Let
BCCI Bloom, Bus. Wk., July 29, 1991, at 16; see also supra notes 86-88 and accompany-
ing text (BCCI chose Luxembourg and the Cayman Islands as its headquarters).
In international banking, the U.S. and Great Britain, the traditional caretakers of
global finance, are usually the regulatory hawks. See Kuttner, supra, at 16. Japan and
Germany, in contrast, have a more national approach to banking and tend to enjoy and
support the competitive strength of their own banks. See id.
99. In giving effect to the principle of consolidated supervision, "host authorities
should ensure that parent authorities are informed immediately of any serious problems
which arise in a parent bank's foreign establishment. Similarly, parent authorities should
inform host authorities when problems arise in a parent bank which are likely to affect
the parent bank's foreign establishment." Basle Text, supra note 14, at 135.
100. See supra note 55 for a definition of subsidiaries.
101. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
102. See BCCI Imbroglio: Predictable... and Predicted, Fin. Reg. Rep., July 1991, at
3-4 [hereinafter BCCI Imbroglio].
103. Under Luxembourg law, the regulators cannot compel a bank to reveal informa-
tion about a depositor unless it can be proved in a Luxembourg court that the depositor is
suspected of a criminal offense-in other words, an offense that is criminal under Luxem-
bourg law. See id. For more information regarding Luxembourg's strict bank secrecy
laws, see Note, Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat Money Laundering, in An-
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Consolidated supervision relies on all pieces of the picture being avail-
able for review. Stringent bank secrecy laws of the kind that exist in
Luxembourg or the Cayman Islands create gaps for review and thus fa-
cilitate criminal activity."°4 The problem becomes circular: a banking
center's willingness to enact secrecy laws attracts criminal activities, and
then the country argues that it could not provide adequate supervision of
those activities because of secrecy laws. 105
5. Dual Nature of the U.S. Banking System
The problems caused by the duality of the banking system are unique
to the United States., °6 The ability of global banks to seek out the weak-
est national regulatory forum is analogous to the situation in the U.S.,
where banks are able to choose the most compliant state or federal regu-
latory environment.107 Of course, allowing banks to select their regula-
tor, on whatever scale, undermines the logic of regulation.' s
Under the IBA, Congress did not require prior federal review of a for-
eign bank's entry into the U.S. banking system, thus leaving the door
open for state regulation." 9 Consequently, with state agencies having
authority over certain matters and federal agencies having authority over
others, cooperation is essential. When dealing with foreign institutions,
however, the presence of dual supervisory and regulatory authorities is
inadequate if there is no effective coordination of supervision over major
foreign banks with operations in more than one state."0  In one indica-
nual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in
the 1990s, 60 Fordhan L. Rev. S429, S454-55 (1992).
104. See BCCI Imbroglio, supra note 102, at 3. For a detailed discussion on bank
secrecy laws' effect on fraud in facilitating insider trading, see Note, Outside Jnvestor" A
New Breed of Insider Traders?, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regula-
tion, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S319, S341
(1992).
105. See BCC1" Regulatory Rights and Wrongs, supra note 94, at 1-2. Considering the
existence of strict bank secrecy laws in Luxembourg, it is certainly incredulous for its
prime minister to then argue that "the normal controls of a state based on laws are insuf-
ficient to prevent deception." Id; see also Luxembourg Will Not Adopt Stricter Banking
Rules in Wake of BCCI Scandal, supra note 95, at 197 (Luxembourg Prime Minister
Santer told his parliament that neither tighter banking regulations nor increased protec-
tion for creditors are needed).
106. See supra notes 38-43 and accompanying text (discussing U.S. banking system).
107. See Kuttner, supra note 98, at 16.
108. See id. In some instances, the motive may be purely innocent. Although state
charters do not offer any outright advantages over national charters, most foreign banks
prefer the accessibility and cooperation associated with the local regulators. See Kraus,
State Officials Fear Losing Foreign-Bank Jurisdiction, Am. Banker, May 14, 1991, at 6.
109. See IBA, supra note 48, § 7, 92 Stat. at 620-21 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C.
§ 3105 (1988)). The IBA sets out a Fed role only after a bank is present in the U.S.
Indeed, 81% of foreign banks operating in the U.S. still choose state regulators. See
Riegle and Garn Introduce Bill to Close Loopholes for Foreign Banks, 56 Banking Rep.
(BNA) No. 19, at 918 (May 13, 1991) [hereinafter Riegle and Garn].
110. See Foreign Banks Hearings, supra note 1, at *2 (statement of Rep. Gonzalez).
While discussing the scandal involving the Banco Nazionale de Lavoro ("BNL"), an At-
lanta-based bank, Representative Gonzalez said "we found state examiners principally
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tion of this failure of the dual banking system, BCCI was able to engage
in long-term criminal activity through its agencies in the U.S.-agencies
that operated under state authority."'
B. Ramifications of a Lack of Consolidated Supervision
1. Ease of Money Laundering
The potential for money laundering is just one example of the
problems created by a lack of consolidated supervision. The U.S. Cus-
toms Service Commissioner has alleged that more than $32 million was
laundered through the offices of BCCI.112 The method by which BCCI
laundered money thus presents another useful illustration of the need for
consolidated supervision. 13
BCCI is said to have laundered drug money in the following way.
Drug money was first deposited in a non-BCCI bank in any city in the
U.S. The money was then wired to an account at BCCI in Tampa that
was set up for the laundering operation. From Tampa the money was
transferred by wire through a non-BCCI New York bank to BCCI head-
quarters in Luxembourg. From there the money was wired to BCCI in
London, where it was placed in a certificate of deposit. This certificate of
deposit was used as a basis to generate a loan in the Bahamas to a phony
corporation set up by the drug dealers. From the Bahamas the money
was wired back into the undercover account in Tampa, where it was
transferred by wire to the BCCI branch in Uruguay. From Uruguay, the
money was transferred as cash into Colombia.I 4
As customs agents explain, the point of the maneuvering "was to keep
the money shifting from country to country and account to account to
make it difficult to trace."15 BCCI undoubtedly created its elaborate
network of transactions within its internal organization, knowing that
without adequate home supervision, and because of the bank's vast struc-
ture, it would be extremely difficult for host regulators to detect any ille-
gal activity.' 16 Other examples of BCCI's seemingly widespread links to
criminal activities include alleged involvement with arms smuggling, for-
concerned with the basic functional qualities solely of the agency or branch in their own
state. No one looked at the totality of the BNL operation in this country." Id. Repre-
sentative Gonzalez says this situation was predictable because the Fed "was not the pri-
mary regulator and the states had no authority to examine other states' operations." Id.
111. BCCI had set up state agencies in New York, California and Florida. BNL, simi-
larly, was established as a state-chartered institution. See 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 1032 (1990).
112. See Schmalz, supra note 88, at D6, col. 4.
113. See id. BCCI pleaded guilty to money laundering charges in Federal Court in
Tampa, Florida in 1988. See id.
114. See How Laundering is Said to Work, N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1988, at D10, col. 5.
115. Schmalz, supra note 88, at D6, col. 4. For a discussion on current reforms con-
cerning money laundering, see Note, Putting Starch in European Efforts to Combat
Money Laundering, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transna-
tional Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. S439-54 (1992).
116. See BCCI Imbroglio, supra note 102, at 3-4.
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mer Panamanian leader Manuel Noriega,1 and terrorist Abu Nidal."'
2. Hidden Ownership Interests
The host country's influence over the condition of foreign banks is lim-
ited because a foreign bank can hide its activities through its parent of-
fice. Foreign banks may be directly affected by the condition of their
parent banks, but the host supervisor has no direct regulatory authority
over these parent banks.119 Thus, in efforts to ensure the soundness of a
foreign bank organization, the host country must collect information
about the bank on a consolidated basis, with parent and affiliate treated
as a single unit. 2
Host-country supervisors, therefore, must know who owns and con-
trols the foreign banks within their borders in order to determine if their
own banking laws are being followed. In the U.S., for example, Section 3
of the BHCA provides that the Fed must approve the acquisition or es-
tablishment of a bank subsidiary by a foreign bank. 2 ' The Fed has
stated that "in general foreign banks seeking to establish banks ... in the
U.S. should meet the same general standards of strength, experience and
reputation as required for domestic organizers of banks and bank holding
companies. '  The Fed, of course, must know the identity of any poten-
tial foreign purchasers of American institutions before it can determine
the foreign company's soundness. Allegedly, however, BCCI was
secretly able to purchase First American Bankshares, Inc., a Washington
D.C. bank holding company, because the Fed was unable to examine the
potential buyers on a consolidated basis.'23 BCCI evidently made secret
117. BCCI has been accused of helping the former leader of Panama, Manuel Noriega
move and hide laundered money. See Lascelles & Hill, The BCCI Shutdown, Citibank in
HK Hit By Rumours, Fin. Times, Aug. 9, 1991, at 8, col. 5. The Panamanian Govern-
ment filed suit against BCCI in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Flor-
ida. See Judge Issues Restraining Order on BCCI, Allows Exceptions for Bank Regulators,
57 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 9, at 339 (Aug. 26, 1991) (discussing several outstanding
court cases against BCCI).
118. BCCI's connections ran far into the depths of underground and clandestine activ-
ities. Intelligence agencies in several countries have been accused of using BCCI for fun-
neling money to various causes, because of its ties to the Middle East and Third World
nations. See Not Just a Bank, supra note 85, at 56.
119. Host nations seek information from parent banks based on the principle of consol-
idated supervision. Problems, however, do arise. See supra notes 97-101 and accompany-
ing text.
120. See Hultman, U.S. International Bank Supervision and the Revised Basle Concor-
dat, Mag. of Bank Admin., Feb. 1985, at 76.
121. See BHCA, supra note 47, § 3(c), 70 Stat. at 134 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1988)).
122. Federal Reserve Board Statement of Policy on Supervision and Regulation of
Foreign Bank Holding Companies, [1978-79] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 97,725.
123. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 578 (1991). The Fed has charged that BCCI illegally
acquired 60% of First American Bankshares, Inc., the Washington area's largest bank
holding company, with $10.6 billion in assets. See Atkinson, Fed Said to Probe BCCI
Ties with Foreign Banks in U.S., Am. Banker, Aug. 20, 1991, at 6.
The Fed has imposed a $200 million fine on BCCI Holdings and several BCCI-related
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nominee loans to "front men", Credit and Commerce American Hold-
ings ("CCAH"), who presented themselves to the Fed for approval. 124
The documents evidencing the arrangements between CCAH sharehold-
ers and BCCI were maintained outside the U.S., thus impeding a thor-
ough investigation.125 Indeed, BCCI allegedly gained control of at least
two other U.S. banks without receiving the necessary approval under the
BHCA 1
26
3. Confusion of Roles
Consolidated supervision diminishes the possibility of a confusion of
roles among banking regulators. Both the home and host regulators
should be aware of their proper duties and perform them. When supervi-
sion is not consolidated, the cooperation necessary for the supervision of
modern international banking institutions is absent as well. Thus, coop-
eration is essential in defining the appropriate roles of home and host
regulators.
Host supervisors are affected by the growth of international banking as
a result of their significant interest in the domestic business of foreign
bank offices. These offices can, and usually do, have a strong effect on the
banks, companies, and individuals for BCCI's alleged use of secret arrangements to gain
illegal ownership interests in several U.S. financial institutions. See id. The Fed an-
nounced its action the same day a Manhattan grand jury handed down a multi-count
indictment against BCCI, several BCCI entities, and two of the bank's founders, charging
the defendants with defrauding depositors, falsifying bank records, and with larcenies
totalling over $30 million. See House Banking Approves BCCI Subpoena Authority;
Riegle Wants Investigation, Banking Daily (BNA), at A-9 (July 31, 1991).
In compliance with the $550 million settlement between BCCI and the U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, the Federal Reserve has agreed to forego the $200 million fine and BCCI
has agreed to plead guilty to charges of secretly acquiring control of First American,
Independence, and the National Bank of Georgia. BCCI will also pay a $10 million fine
resulting from the charges filed by the Manhattan District Attorney. See BCCI Agrees to
Plead Guilty and Will Forfeit $550 Million, supra note 5, at D2, col. 1.
124. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 577 (1991). On April 19, 1982, after months of inves-
tigation, the Fed approved the Middle Eastern investors' acquisition of First American
provided they remain passive investors. The Fed received financial statements, state-
ments identifying the source of funds to be used to make the acquisition, and letters from
the potential shareholders' banks confirming their financial statements. The Fed also
conducted background checks on the proposed shareholders. CCAH expressly told the
Fed that BCCI would not be involved in the acquisition of First American other than as
an investment advisor. On the basis of these assurances, the Fed approved CCAH's ac-
quisition of First American. See id. at 574-75.
125. See id. In proposing the FBSEA, Senator Riegle suggested that the lack of suffi-
cient information resulted in the Fed's approval of CCAH's purchase of First American,
because the Fed never knew precisely who the owners of CCAH were. See Federal Re-
serve Seeks Control Over U.S. Activities of Non-U.S. Banks, Fin. Reg. Rep., May 1991, at
119.
126. They are Independence Bank, located in Encino, California, and the National
Bank of Georgia. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 577-78 (1991). In March 1991, the Fed
issued a cease and desist order, consented to by BCCI without admitting or denying any
wrongdoing, that requires BCCI to divest itself of any shares of Independence Bank that
it controls. BCCI was also required to divest itself of shares in the National Bank of
Georgia. See id.
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domestic banking industry, especially if they accept retail deposits.1 27
When confusion arises as to the proper role of both the home and host
regulators, problems are not far behind."' As a general rule, however,
home regulators are believed to provide better control for services across
borders, while host regulators are better positioned to control services
that occur within the host's border. 129
Confusion also arises in the enforcement of regulations. When na-
tional regulators lack clear roles, even after authorities know there is a
problem with a particular bank, there may be no effective enforcement
framework in place. 3 For example, even after international regulators
had evidence that BCCI was a crime-ridden institution, it still took sev-
eral years to either shut BCCI down or revamp its structure.13 ' Finally,
in 1987, trouble with BCCI became too apparent to avoid and regulators
placed BCCI's worldwide operations under the supervision of a "college
of supervisors" from the countries where it had its main businesses.' 32
This approach was clearly ineffective in averting the eventual shutdown
of BCCI, however, because the "college" was only able to move "at the
pace of its slowest member," and some members refrained from acting in
order to avoid a scandal in their own countries.' 33
Moreover, as far back as 1978, some banking experts wrote about the
defects in BCCI's structure while others were presaging the collapse to
127. See Foreign Banks, supra note 2, at 20A_
128. Regulators want to promote competition, ensure the safety of banks and the bank-
ing system, and look after consumers' interest. The choice is whether to apply the home
country's or the host country's rules, or to combine them resulting in harmonized rules
acceptable to both. See Home Thoughts From Abroad, Economist, Aug. 17, 1991, at 74.
129. Home regulators are more capable of reviewing the totality of the operation be-
cause, at least theoretically, the home office should know what is happening with its
affiliates around the globe. See generally International Coordination, supra note 10, at 17
("solvency supervision was predominantly a parent authority responsibility. For subsidi-
aries and joint ventures, primary responsibility rests with host authorities.").
130. Regulators in the U.S. and Luxembourg are at odds over who controls BCCI's
stake in First American. According to reports, Luxembourg is now in control of at least
25% of the stock of First American Bankshares. The Fed had planned to sell BCCI's
illegal holdings in First American, and requested instructions from the Luxembourg au-
thorities, whom the Fed believes are in control of BCCI's stake in First American. The
director of the Luxembourg Monetary Institute, Pierre Jaans, however, claims this is a
U.S. legal problem and not under the responsibility of the Luxembourg authorities. See
Atkinson, Luxembourg Is Left Holding 25% Stake in First American, Am. Banker, July
10, 1991 at 2; Kraus, Regulators at Odds Over BCCI Stake in D.C Bank, Am. Banker,
July 12, 1991, at 1.
For a detailed discussion of the legal and jurisdictional problems facing international
regulators, see F. Ryder, Legal Problems of International Banking 45-62 (1987).
131. A BCCI agency was convicted of money laundering charges in Florida in 1988.
See Schmalz, supra note 88, at D6, col. 4.
132. See Maremont, supra note 89, at 54. In 1987, regulators from Luxembourg, Brit-
ain, France, Spain, Switzerland and the Cayman Islands formed a special "college" just
to exchange information. See id. at 55. The college, however, did not include many
countries in which BCCI had big operations, including the U.S. See id.
133. See Donkin & Lascelles, The Scandal That Remains a Mystery, Fin. Times, July
13, 1991, at 6, col. 5.
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come. 134 Indeed, all of the factors relevant to the collapse of BCCI in
1991 were evident in the late 1980s, including, among other things, the
absence of a lender of last resort, the criminal attraction to bank secrecy
havens, and the labyrinthian holding company structure.1 35 Yet several
years passed before any definitive action commenced. 36
Finally, another potential confusion in the international regulatory
scheme is the role of a lender of last resort. 137 BCCI has been called the
world's largest bank without a lender of last resort.'3 8 The home author-
ity traditionally performs this role.13 9 In this instance, because BCCI is
largely a dollar-based bank, "its sudden failure would have threatened
the integrity of the U.S. payments/settlement system, possibly forcing
the U.S. authorities to provide emergency support.""'' Without a clear
definition of roles, a host country's central bank might be called upon to
cover losses created by a foreign institution. 4'
134. See BCCI Imbroglio, supra note 102, at 3. In a reprint of an article from 1988,
one commentator had asked who, under the principle of consolidated supervision, is sup-
posed to be supervising BCCI, and who, if anybody, would rescue BCCI if it were to
experience a confidence-induced liquidity crisis. See id. Even more disturbing is a recent
disclosure that, in 1978, a senior American bank examiner warned U.S. banking regula-
tors that BCCI was engaged in the same practices for which it was closed thirteen years
later. See Lohr, U.S. Memo Saw BCCI Trouble in '78, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1992, at Dl,
col. 6.
135. See id.
136. During the current investigation, evidence leaked out that the Bank of England
and other regulators knew of financial malpractice, if not fraud, at BCCI for several
years. See The BCCI Affair: Blaming the Bank of England, Economist, July 20, 1991, at
88. The Bank of England contends, in part, that it did not act earlier because it was only
one of many national regulators and had limited power to act on its own. See id. at 92.
137. See Pecchioli, supra note 49, at 108; see also supra notes 45-46 and accompanying
text (defining lender of last resort as the agency that will provide reserves to prevent a
bank failure or, if a bank has failed, it will guarantee payment to depositors).
138. See Four European Central Banks are Monitoring BCCI Dealings, supra note 84,
at 28, col. 3.
139. See generally Pecchioli, supra note 49, at 108-09 (explaining the market need for a
lender of last resort).
140. BCCL Regulatory Rights and Wrongs, supra note 94, at 1-2. What is certain is
that in today's marketplace, it is an absurdity to permit any bank, let alone a $20 billion
institution such as BCCI, to operate internationally without clear lines of access to a
lender of last resort. It is also certain that Luxembourg was not prepared to fill this role.
See BCCI Imbroglio, supra note 102, at 3-4.
141. See BCCI Imbroglio, supra note 102, at 4. This would be a politically unaccept-
able situation, for example, if the Bank of England is forced to bail out a Luxembourg-
based bank. See Brittan, Lessons of BCCIfor the Regulators, Fin. Times, July 29, 1991,
at 11, col. 1; see also infra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (both discussing EC
deposit guarantee reforms).
In the U.S., the Fed, in its role as the central bank and the lender of last resort, has
indicated that it is prepared to make sure that two banks secretly owned by BCCI, First
American and Independence Bank of Encino, California do not fail by providing financial
support. See 2 Banks Tied to BCCI Get Aid From a Worried Federal Reserve, supra note
46, at Al, col. 5. This is a politically sensitive issue, as well, for bank regulators regard
the possible collapse of either of these two banks as "politically dynamite, especially given
the criticism of the [Bush] Administration's handling of the BCCI investigation." Id.
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4. Ease of Fraud
Finally, inadequate supervision creates a climate in which fraud is
more likely to occur. 142 Fraud thrived in BCCI, for example, due to the
lack of proper supervision. 143 Among the fraudulent acts committed by
some of BCCI's senior management was the disguising of losses that the
bank suffered from bad loans and speculation in the money markets. 144
BCCI management allegedly took deposits but failed to enter them on
the bank's books. Instead, bank officials used the money directly to cover
the bank's losses.145 Thus, in this instance, a simple decision regarding
accounting enabled fraud at BCCI to go undetected.", Had there been
proper supervision, BCCI fraud might have been detected earlier.
III. REFORM
Gaps in the current regulatory framework-as unveiled in part by the
BCCI scandal--demonstrate the need for reform in order to prevent a
"BCCI" from recurring and to ensure that the new regulatory system of
the 1990s complies with the standards of consolidated supervision. Spe-
cifically, closing this gap requires reform in the areas of home- and host-
country control and cooperation with foreign supervisors.
Some reform measures have been codified in proposed legislation, both
by the EC and by the U.S. Congress. Some aspects of bank regulation,
however, do not require more legislation, but simply more coopera-
tion.147 For its part, the Basle Committee plans to put global regulation
of financial institutions at the top of its agenda. 141 Yet while the most
significant developments in banking supervision usually occur in re-
Providing federal money to cover depositors' losses, however, would also be anathema to
many taxpayers who must already shoulder the burden created by the S&L crisis.
142. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 3.
143. See The Biggest Bank Fraud in History, supra note 76, at 1, cols. 3-4; see also
BCCI and S. 1019: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of
the Senate Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs Comm., 102d Cong. Ist. Sess. *3 (May
23, 1991), available in LEXIS, Nexis library, Fednews file [hereinafter BCCI Hearings]
(statement of Jack Blum, Former Senate Investigator). In his testimony before Congress,
Blum said, "[BCCI] operated without a supervisor that could ensure consolidated super-
vision. The absence of... consolidated supervision was... critical to BCCI's ability to
carry out the manipulation of its books and the concealment of its actual financial condi-
tion." Id
144. See The Scandal That Remains a Mystery, supra note 133, at 6, cols. 3-4.
145. See id
146. Accounting also contributed to another method of fraud. One former BCCI exec-
utive explained that accounts used to be falsified around September before auditors came
in. The figures were then reversed after the end of the year. This creative accounting
allowed the bank to show more profitable commissions on its books during the last quar-
ter of the year. See id.
147. See infra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
148. The new chairman of the Basle Committee is Gerald Corrigan, the former head of
the New York Fed. From his previous statements, we can expect the Basle Committee to
proceed rigorously with this agenda. See Kraus, Corrigan Seeks Tighter Global Stan-
dards of Bank Supervision, Am. Banker, Aug. 1, 1991, at 6.
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sponse to crises,' 49 it is important, when analyzing the problems illus-
trated by BCCI, that legislators not compensate for a lack of regulatory
controls over BCCI by merely overregulating banking.
A. Reform In The EC
As the world anxiously monitors the emergence of the proposed Single
Market of the European Community, it is clear that this market will
present a great challenge for international bank regulators in the 1990s.
The Community itself has attempted to address several of the more criti-
cal concerns. 150 Under the Second Banking Directive, for example, any
bank licensed by a member state would have unrestricted access to any
other member state.' A Consolidated Supervision Directive and sev-
eral other directives are designed to prevent the potential problems-
discussed below-that are likely to stem from such free access.'
52
1. Home-Country Supervision
The EC has adopted a three-faceted approach to banking regulation:
(1) the necessary harmonization of capital requirements law, standards of
149. For example, the Basle Concordat was revised after the scandals of the Banco
Ambrosiano, Italy and the Herstatt bank in Germany. See supra note 7; see also Malloy,
Bumper Cars: Themes of Convergence in International Regulation, in Annual Survey of
Financial Institutions and Regulation, Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60
Fordham L. Rev. S1, S12-14 (1992) (discussing the reactive nature of banking
regulations).
150. See 1987 Single European Act, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1. For an in depth discussion of
the proposed 1992 single European market and its affect on banking, see Note, Banking
on Europe: 1992 and EMU, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation,
Transnational Financial Services in the 1990s, 60 Fordham L. Rev. 5395, S396-418
(1992).
151. See Second Council Directive 89/646 of 15 December 1989 on the Coordination
of Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pur-
suit of the Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 1989 O.J. (L
386) 1. The central element of the Second Banking Directive is the granting of a single
license by the home supervisory authority that will allow a credit institution to establish a
branch in, or provide cross-border services into, any other member state on the basis of
that authorization. See 1992-Financial Services, supra note 30, at 40, 53. The Second
Banking Directive also calls for the coordination of laws, regulations, and administrative
provisions relating to the taking-up and pursuit of the business of credit institutions. The
result of this Directive will be the creation of uniform regulatory and supervisory stan-
dards for the European Community. See id.
152. See Council Directive 89/647 of 18 December 1989 on a Solvency Ratio for
Credit Institutions, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14; Commission Recommendation 87/63 of 22
December 1986 Concerning the Introduction of Deposit-Guarantee Schemes in the Com-
munity, 1987 O.J. (L 33) 16; Commission Recommendation 87/62 of 22 December 1986
on Monitoring and Controlling Large Exposures of Credit Institutions, 1987 O.J. (L 33)
10; see also 1992-Financial Services, supra note 30, at 58-63 (discussing the contents and
provisions of the various directives.)
The Consolidated Supervision Directive places further definite obligations on the na-
tional authorities of member states to provide one another with all the information about
the operations of the different parts of a group. In case of difficulty, one nation may send
its own investigators to check on information coming from another. See Consolidated
Supervision Directive, supra note 30.
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experience for management, and monitoring of liquidity and solvency; 53
(2) mutual recognition by the national supervisory authorities that each
will follow this harmonization;154 and (3) the theory of home-country
control through coordination of national supervisory activities.'55
A bank such as BCCI would have been severely hindered in con-
ducting its suspect activities had the Second Banking Directive and the
other Directives been in place earlier. 5 6 While supervision of banks will
remain the responsibility of the member states' own authorities, they will
be working within a Community-wide framework of rules designed to
maintain strict standards. Specifically, based on the new framework,
Luxembourg would have been statutorily responsible for many of the su-
pervisory activities it had declined to perform while BCCI perpetuated
its scams. 157 To ensure prudent supervision, Great Britain has further
proposed that a bank's home regulator be liable when depositors in an-
other EC country lose money. 158 This would encourage regulators to
exercise tighter control over international banks based in their
jurisdiction.15 9
153. See A Common Market for Services 5 (1988) [hereinafter Common Market].
154. See id
155. See id This will mean that a bank operating in other member states will be under
the control of the authorities in its home base. See iL
156. See BCCI Affair Triggers Community Move to Toughen Depositor Insurance Pro-
tection, Thomson's Int'l Banking Reg., Aug. 9, 1991, at 3 [hereinafter BCCI Affair Trig-
gers Community Move]; see also Lessons of BCCI for the Regulators, supra note 141, at I 1
(Sir Brittan argues that a series of EC initiatives will lessen the risk of bank failure). The
Second Banking Directive and the supporting measures already lay down a clear line of
responsibility for authorizing and supervising banks on the basis of home-country con-
trol, the single banking license, and mutual recognition between member states.
EC legislation also removes all obstacles, including banking secrecy, to a full and rapid
exchange of information between national supervisors. Thus, the home-country supervi-
sor can have access to all relevant facts about every bank under its control. See supra
note 152 and accompanying text (discussing the Consolidated Supervision Directive).
157. See EC Weighs Deposit Compensation Scheme After BCCI, Reuters, Money Rep.,
July 24, 1991, available in LEXIS, Banks library, Monrpt file. The Consolidated Supervi-
sion Directive would deal directly with holding companies based in one country but oper-
ating mainly in another. For example, BCCI, was a holding company based in
Luxembourg, but did much of its business in other countries. See BCCI: Till Drugs Do
Us Part, supra note 85, at 96. The main supervisory function under such circumstances
will lie with the home country or with the country where the main EC banking is located.
The underlying principle of the proposed directive, however, is that "supervision should
as far as possible be led by the member state in which the group's banking business is
done." Lessons of BCCIfor the Regulators, supra note 141, at 12. Thus, the Bank of
England would have had the primary responsibility to supervise BCCI, rather than the
Luxembourg Monetary Institute.
158. See EC Weighs Deposit Compensation Scheme After BCCI, supra note 157; see also
BCCI Affair Triggers Community Move, supra note 156, at 3 (BCCI scandal shows the
need for new EC measures on deposit insurance).
159. See BCCI Affair Triggers Community Move, supra note 156, at 3. This will pro-
vide additional incentives for countries to insist on tighter regulations for banks licensed
in their territory because they will be forced to compensate depositors with their own
funds in the event of bank failures.
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2. Cooperation with Foreign Supervisors
A crucial aspect of supervising international banks is cooperation and
coordination with the home-country regulators of such banks."6 While
the EC has set up a system whereby cooperation is assured within the
Community, cooperation between the EC and foreign regulators remains
in the domain of bilateral agreements.1 61
The Basle Committee calls for increased coordination among interna-
tional regulatory bodies. It can only recommend to its member states
how to regulate banks, however; it cannot simply impose conditions.
Therefore, the Committee remains no more than an informal arrange-
ment. 162 International regulators still need tighter international collabo-
ration, as well as the imposition of international rules on national
regulators to prevent scandals from occurring at all.'63 Some have called
for the Bank for International Settlements ("BIS"), the "central bankers'
central bank," to assume the role of supervising the supervisors.' 6
The BCCI scandal did demonstrate a certain amount of international
cooperation during the clean-up stage. 165 In a recent study, however, the
United Nations Center on Transnational Corporations was highly criti-
cal of the country-by-country settlements pursued by some of the nations
involved with the BCCI closure.'66 The study calls for the appointment
of an international group of trustees to oversee depositors' claims and to
deal with some of the other "transnational issues."' 167
160. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (discussing consolidated
supervision).
161. See Common Market, supra note 153, at 15.
162. See Mendelsohn, supra note 16, at 2. Sydney Key, an economist with the Fed and
co-author of the G-30 report, a study on the problems of supervising international banks,
argues that the Basle Concordat is too narrow in scope and covers too few countries. See
First Step Towards Tougher Regulation, supra note 93, at 13, col. I.
163. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 3.
164. See Kuttner, supra note 98, at 16. The nomination of Gerald Corrigan, current
president of the New York office of the Fed, to head the Committee on Banking Supervi-
sion of the BIS is an indication that the BIS will most likely play a greater role in interna-
tional bank supervision. See Corrigan Nomination to BIS Said to Signal Hands-on Role
by U.S. in Monetary Policy, 57 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 3, at 120 (July 15, 1991). In-
deed, following the BCCI operation, Corrigan indicated that it was his job to build on the
cooperation exhibited with BCCI. See id. In 1987, Corrigan called for a greater central-
ized international financial regulatory system. As Corrigan explained, "there is a broad-
based recognition among commercial bankers and central bankers alike.., that market
conditions dictate a higher degree of convergence in regulatory and supervisory, as well
as the operations and legal systems." More Centralized International Financial Regula-
tory System Needed, Bankers Told, 48 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 26, at 1130 (June 29,
1987).
165. The closure of BCCI's international operations took place in several countries on
July 5, 1991. Banking regulators from at least eight different countries cooperated, in-
cluding the U.S., England, Luxembourg, and the Cayman Islands. See Luxembourg is
Left Holding 25% Stake in First American, supra note 130, at 2.
166. See Lohr, UN Study Assails the Way BCCI Was Shut by Western Central Banks,
N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1992, at D7, col. 1 [hereinafter U.N. Study Assails].
167. Id. at D7, cols. 3-4.
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3. Deposit-Guarantee Schemes
The EC has also recommended that member states set up harmonized
systems to protect depositors if a banking institution becomes insol-
vent.16 The EC calls for the national authorities in the home country to
be responsible for the "winding up" of the bank. 169 If the home country
is outside the EC, the authorities in the host-member state would be re-
sponsible for the condition of the bank unless there is a bilateral agree-
ment with the home country. 170 This move would aid the jurisdictional
problems of lenders of last resort. 7 '
B. Reform In The U.S.
Underlying reform proposals in the United States is, according to for-
mer FDIC Chairman L. William Seidman, "the need for a single regula-
tor for financial institutions."' 172 Among the competing banking reform
bills pending,' 73 only the Fed, in its proposed Foreign Bank Supervision
Enhancement Act of 1991 ("FBSEA"),'74 seeks to remedy the gaps in
current U.S. regulation and to give meaning to the "super" aspect of
supervision.'75 The FBSEA supports the premise of national treatment
168. See Commission Recommendation 87/63 of 22 December 1986 Concerning the
Introduction of Deposit-Guarantee Schemes in the Community, 1987 OJ. (L 33) 16.
This directive solicits member states' cooperation to introduce, on a voluntary basis, de-
posit-guarantee schemes that will provide the same level of protection throughout the
Community. See 1992-Financial Services, supra note 30, at 50-51.
169. See Common Market, supra note 153, at 15. The amended proposal to the De-
posit Guarantee Directive provides that
measures taken by the supervisory authority... in the home country to prevent
the failure of a credit institution, or wind it up, will also apply to any branches
of that institution in other [m]ember [s]tates. Member [s]tates must ensure that
there are no legal obstacles preventing the application of these measures to
branches within their territory, by a branch's home supervisory authority.
1992-Financial Services, supra note 30, at 58.
170. See Common Market, supra note 153, at 15.
171. Jurisdictional problems involve, with respect to banks involved in foreign ex-
change, the currency that will be used by the lender of last resort. Any agreements in this
area would help solve potential conflicts. See Pecchioli, supra note 49, at 109.
172. Fed Hits BCCI with $200 Million Penalty as N. Y Grand Jury Hands Down Indict-
ments, supra note 27, at 210. Chairman Seidman made his remarks in reference to the
lessons the BCCI scandal demonstrate to U.S. regulators. See iL
173. The reform legislation advanced by the Treasury Department would "require for-
eign banks operating in the United States to establish holding companies [in the U.S.] if
they wish to engage in securities and insurance activities." Greenspan Urges Congress to
Amend Section 231 with Proposed Fed Bill, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 24, at 1158 (June
17, 1991). Section 231 of the proposal also would require any foreign bank that chooses
to engage in such expanded financial activities to conduct all of its U.S. banking business
through a U.S. subsidiary bank and to close or "roll up" its U.S. branches and agencies
into to that bank. See id
174. S. 1019, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) [hereinafter FBSEA].
175. The FBSEA was proposed by the Fed in response to well-publicized abusive ac-
tivities by foreign banks operating in this country. See Foreign Banks Hearings, supra
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for foreign banks176 and recommends that the Fed serve as the primary
U.S. regulator of foreign banks' American operations. 177
The IBA subjected foreign banks with American branches and agen-
cies to federal regulation, chiefly requiring them to maintain reserves and
generally limiting their activities and geographic expansion in the United
States.17' The IBA did, however, leave foreign banks free of certain fed-
eral requirements applicable to U.S. banks. 179
1. Home- and Host-Country Control
The Fed's proposal would ensure that both foreign banks' U.S. opera-
tions and U.S. national banks are regulated, supervised, and examined in
the same manner.'8 0 This does not necessarily mean that such supervi-
sion entails exactly the same methods as those used for domestic institu-
tions, because there are inherent differences between domestic banks
doing business in the United States and foreign based banks doing busi-
ness in the United States.18'
Through the FBSEA, the Fed seeks to create a statutory requirement
that "any foreign bank entrant be subject to comprehensive supervision
on a consolidated basis by a home country regulator."' 2 To this end,
the FBSEA requires that any potential entrant into the U.S. banking
market identify its principal home-country supervisor 8 3 If this parent
organization's supervision does not meet the requirements of the federal
note 1, at *4 (statement of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board). These
banking scandals include BCCI and an Atlanta-based bank, BNL.
Weaknesses in the regulatory scheme allowed BNL to provide about 3 billion dollars in
unauthorized and illegal loans to Iraq in direct conflict with U.S. foreign policy interests.
See Riegle and Garn, supra note 109, at 918. The state of Georgia examined the Atlanta
agency of BNL, with participation by the Fed. See 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 1032, 1033 (1990).
176. See Foreign Banks Hearings, supra note 1, at *4 (statement of Alan Greenspan,
Chairman, Federal Reserve Board).
177. The Fed is best suited for this role because it is the nation's central bank and must
therefore, maintain national monetary and fiscal policy. See Mishkin, supra note 9, at
387-88.
178. See IBA, supra note 48, §§ 4-5, 92 Stat. at 610-14 (codified as amended at 12
U.S.C. §§ 3102-03 (1988)).
179. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 578 (1991). For example, Congress did not require
prior Federal review of foreign bank entry into the U.S., something the Fed had then
proposed. See id. at 579.
180. See id. at 579. To this end, the FBSEA would establish uniform federal standards
for entry and expansion of foreign banks in the U.S., including a requirement of consoli-
dated home-country supervision and the application of the same financial, managerial,
and operational standards that govern U.S. banks. See id. The proposal would also grant
regulators the power to terminate the activities of a foreign bank that is engaging in
illegal, unsafe, or unsound practices and provide regulators with the information-gather-
ing tools necessary to carry out their supervisory responsibilities. See id.
181. For example, the information necessary for determining the safety and soundness
of domestic banks is located within this country. Information on foreign institutions,
however, is generally located abroad. Additionally, foreign institutions are governed by
rules and regulations of foreign nations. See supra notes 119-26 and accompanying text.
182. 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 580 (1991).
183. See FBSEA, supra note 174, § (2)(a) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 3105 (1988)).
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regulators, the federal regulators can deny entry.'8
2. Cooperation with Foreign Supervisors
The Fed also seeks to mandate cooperation with foreign supervisory
bodies. Most regulatory schemes are drawn naturally from domestic sys-
tems and are based on legal frameworks and accounting conventions that
may vary significantly from country to country.s' It is thus imperative
that banking regulations allow supervisors sufficient flexibility to respond
to what is happening in the markets around the world. 8 6 The Fed,
therefore, has proposed that the IBA be amended to clarify that federal
banking agencies would be authorized to share supervisory information
with their foreign counterparts, subject to adequate assurances of confi-
dentiality. 87 Additionally, there must be a method to ensure that the
Fed will have access to the information it needs to determine whether a
bank is complying with U.S. banking requirements. 18 Experience with
BCCI demonstrates the critical importance of such access. 89
3. Entry into the U.S. Market
As a qualification for entry into the United States, the FBSEA would
require adequate assurances by a bank that its home supervisors will pro-
vide the necessary information to ensure and enforce the bank's compli-
ance with American banking requirements.", This provision may also
reduce the attraction of offshore banking secrecy centers. If the United
States makes it clear that a banking entity attempting to hide its activities
will not be permitted to do business in the United States, many banks
might re-think their strategies.
Additionally, under the current U.S. system, each state bases foreign
bank entry on its own criteria-which can, and do, differ substantially
from state to state.19 1 BCCI illustrates the need for a common set of
184. See id §§ (2)(a), (d)(5) (amending 12 U.S.C. §§ 3105, 1842(c) (1988)).
185. See Cross-Border Banking, supra note 1, at 116.
186. See id In the absence of a blueprint that provides for the regulation of the activi-
ties of all multinational financial companies, supervisors must work together to try to
ensure that business can be conducted efficiently and legitimately.
187. See FBSEA, supra note 174, § (2)(d)(5) (amending 12 U.S.C. 1842(c) (1988)).
Indeed, the proposed Consolidated Supervision Directive of the EC contains similar pro-
visions. See Lessons of BCCIfor the Regulators, supra note 141, at 11, col. 1. This direc-
tive would give the EC Commission the "power to negotiate agreements with third
countries to extend consolidated supervision and the exchange of confidential information
to banks and other credit institutions established in those countries with subsidiaries in
the Community." Id EC Commissioner Sir Leon Brittan states that "[r]eaching formal
agreements on effective information-sharing with supervisors from countries outside the
Community will be a priority for us in the years ahead. Such agreements are the founda-
tion of effective supervision of banks involved in global business." Id at 11, col. 3.
188. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 580 (1991).
189. See supra notes 119-26, 130-33 and accompanying text for a discussion of hidden
ownership interests and enforcement abilities.
190. See FBSEA, supra note 174, § (2)(d)(5) (amending 12 U.S.C. § 1842(c) (1988)).
191. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 579 (1991).
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standards applicable to all foreign entrants into the U.S. banking system,
whether through federal or state charter. 192
BCCI chose to enter the U.S. banking market by establishing agencies
under state regulation.' 93 BCCI likely chose this structure because it be-
lieved state regulators would not be as capable as federal regulators in
assessing the soundness of BCCI's parent organization.194 Thus, through
the FBSEA the Fed proposes a federal approval process that would apply
common standards to the proposed entry by a foreign bank through
either a state or federally licensed office, or through a commercial lend-
ing company.' 95 While the IBA gave the Fed certain duties in the super-
vision of foreign banks, no federal agency has a voice in deciding whether
individual institutions seeking to enter U.S. markets through state
branches, agencies, or commercial lending companies meet the standards
generally applicable to banking organizations in this country. 96 Under
the FBSEA, the Fed would be given the ultimate authority to reject a
potential entrant or even to remove a license, once granted, if the Fed
determines that certain guidelines are not being met. 197 The Fed propo-
sal also attempts to prevent hidden ownership interests by requiring the
reporting of loans secured by the stock of an American bank.' 9
In many cases, simply closing a corrupt bank might be too drastic and
192. This would insure against some jurisdictions applying minimal standards to insti-
tutions. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 569, 571 (1991).
193. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
194. As one would expect, this suggestion is strongly discounted by state regulators.
Jill M. Considine, Superintendent of Banking for New York State, argues that the Fed
already has all the statutory authority necessary to achieve adequate supervision of for-
eign banks operating in the U.S., and that the Fed is actively involved in examining both
state- and federally chartered banks. See Considine, Regulation of Foreign Banks Needs
No Fixing, Am. Banker, May 31, 1991, at 4. Considine further argues that "the record of
state regulation of foreign banks has been good." Id.
195. See FBSEA, supra note 174, § 2.
196. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 572, 580 (1991).
197. See FBSEA, supra note 174, § 2. Support for this provision of the FBSEA was
not unanimous. Sidney A. Bailey, Virginia's Commissioner of Financial Institutions, rec-
ognizing the apparent rebuke to state authority, told the panel that the Fed did have the
authority to prohibit the acquisition of First American Bankshares, Inc. by BCCI in
1981. Mr. Bailey claims that granting the Fed this ultimate authority "will break some-
thing that has worked well and effectively for a century"-namely, state authority to
control the entry of banks into the state. See Fed-Drafted Bill on Foreign Control Gets
Mixed Reviews Before Senate Banking, 56 Banking Rep. (BNA) No. 22, at 1041-42 (June
3, 1991).
New York District Attorney Robert Morgenthau disagreed, contending that giving
"the Fed authority over the entry of foreign banks into the United States would not
preempt state regulations or render state regulators unnecessary." Id. at 1042. Mr. Mor-
genthau argued that only the Fed can deal with the central banks of foreign countries and
prevent interstate abuses. He added that "the Fed is 'ideally positioned' to uncover
money laundering schemes since it monitors the U.S. cash flow." Id.
198. Alan Greenspan assured Congress that this reporting requirement would go a
long way toward eliminating the problems of supervising foreign banks. He stated that
"we have no way to make absolutely certain, under all conditions, that there isn't a sec-
ond, third, or fourth tranche of type of ownership which we would be able to extract."
Foreign Banks Hearings, supra note 1, at * 14. Greenspan believes, though, that many of
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might, unwittingly, lead to greater difficulties.' 99 There will be many ad-
ditional problems should the Fed start closing every foreign branch it
deems under inadequate home-country control, and the Fed and other
regulatory authorities should certainly explore other alternatives.' A
United Nations group calls for what would amount to " 'an international
Chapter 11,' a reference to the American bankruptcy law under which
insolvent companies are allowed to operate under court protection."2 °'
When dealing with a corrupt institution such as BCCI, the group suggest
regulators should separate the fraud-tainted portions of the entity from
the rest of its operations. 2
The Treasury banking reform bill2"3 would require that all foreign
banking institutions wishing to conduct business in the United States
structure themselves as subsidiaries.2' This has indicia of overregula-
tion, however, because it limits the autonomy of the parent bank by forc-
ing it to structure its U.S. affiliate as an independent entity. Foreign
regulatory bodies would almost certainly respond to this challenge by
applying tougher standards to U.S. banks abroad. 5 The FBSEA, how-
ever, successfully merges the interests of domestic and foreign banking
and has proposed a reform bill that will be a major step in remedying
many of the inefficiencies and shortcomings in the current regulatory
framework.
the glaring problems that the Fed confronted in the ownership question of First Ameri-
can and BCCI will be addressed. See it
199. Once present in the U.S., a bank would face closure under FBSEA § 2, which
provides that the Fed may terminate the activities of a foreign bank if "there is reasonable
cause to believe that such foreign bank, or any affiliate of such foreign bank, has commit-
ted a violation of law or engaged in an unsafe or unsound banking practice in the United
States." FBSEA, supra note 174, § 2.
200. Repeated closure of foreign-based banks will likely lead to a depositor run every
time another bank is closed. Host countries should, therefore, have options for exerting
control over dubious institutions within their borders other than simply closing the insti-
tution. For example, British law gives the Bank of England "broad discretion" to inter-
vene in the management of corrupt institutions. See The BCCIAffair Blaming the Bank
of England, supra note 136, at 92.
When a bank with branches in England keeps its corporate headquarters elsewhere, the
Bank of England generally defers to the home regulator. It can take over the British
branches, however, if that regulator lacks the capacity for proper supervision, or if the
bank's main business is in England. See id In exercising this authority, the Bank of
England can, among other things, remove managers, restrict deposit-taking, or demand
higher liquidity. If these options do not work, then the regulator can choose to close the
bank down. See id
201. U.N. Study Assails, supra note 166, at D7, col. 3.
202. See id
203. H.R. 1505, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
204. See id
205. See Foreign Banks Hearings, supra note 1, at *5 (statement of Mr. Greenspan).
Greenspan argues that enactment of the Treasury reform bill would burden foreign insti-
tutions with additional costs and that it could scale back commercial lending activity.
Thus, even if requiring foreign banks to restructure themselves does not lead to retalia-
tory practices abroad, the Treasury bill might lead foreign banks, which account for 30%
of all commercial lending in the U.S., to cut back on their U.S. operations. Consequently,
the share of lending generated by foreign banks may decrease. See id. at *9-10.
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4. Non-legislative Steps
Not every reform must take the form of legislation, and there are sev-
eral non-legislative steps that regulators might take. Increased coordina-
tion is needed among the primary state and federal supervisors of foreign
branches and agencies to ensure that these offices are subject to examina-
tion on a regular basis."3 With BCCI, this examination occurred only
after regulators detected signs of trouble.20 7
The Fed has proposed increased sharing of information and resources
between the Federal Reserve and the state authorities that license foreign
banks.20 Part of this cooperation is a program for conducting simulta-
neous examination of all the U.S. offices of foreign banks to obtain a
comprehensive view of the bank's American operations." 9 The Fed also
proposes annual on-site examinations as well as other programs now em-
ployed for state member banks.210 Furthermore, the states might defer
to the Fed on matters relating to cooperation with foreign parent institu-
tions, in order to consolidate the U.S. national approach.
Another lesson that the BCCI debacle suggests is that regulators
should intervene early in the affairs of a mismanaged bank. For years
BCCI operated as an outcast in top financial centers, while regulators
simply stood by and hoped things would improve.211
C. Preventing Fraud: More Emphasis Needed
There are inadequate instruments available for detecting bank
fraud.212 While banking supervisors monitor banks for prudent conduct,
auditors claim that their only job is to check accounts and assert that it is
up to management to detect fraud.21 3 In the case of BCCI, though, the
management was perpetrating the fraud. The Luxembourg regulators
have stated that their regulatory arrangements were unable to cope with
fraud.214 Fraud and criminal activity, however, are likely to gravitate to
financial centers with a weak regulatory environment and strong secrecy
206. William Taylor, Staff Director for the Fed's Banking Supervision and Regulation
Division, claims that stepped-up, on-site examinations of foreign banks are essential to
ensure adequate supervision. See 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 569, 571 (1991).
207. See BCC1. Regulatory Rights and Wrongs, supra note 94, at 1-2.
208. See FBSEA, supra note 174, § 3.
209. See id. Under the IBA, the Fed must rely on the reports of other regulators to the
extent possible. Under this provision of the FBSEA, the Fed would be allowed to call for
coordinated or simultaneous examinations and coordinate efforts among the states. Si-
multaneous examinations would reduce the likelihood of those schemes through which
banks move collateral from one branch to the next just ahead of the examiner.
210. See id.
211. See Behind Closed Doors, Economist, July 13, 1991, at 14. While waiting for
"proof" of fraud, regulators did set up a "college of supervisors." See id. This only
served, however, to prolong the regulatory review process since supervision was then split
up among seven nations. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
212. See First Steps Towards Tougher Regulation, supra note 93, at 13, col. 5.
213. See id.
214. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 7.
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laws.2 15 Therefore, offshore banking centers should be overhauled so as
to eliminate them as a magnet for criminal activities.2" 6
Additionally, while no regulation can prevent fraud completely, there
are ways to stem its growth-through more on-site examinations,"' for
example, and perhaps through a reassessment of the role of the audi-
tor.21 8 There have also been calls to strengthen U.S. control over money
laundering activities through statutes specifically providing investigators
with venue choice and jurisdiction.2 19 A money laundering directive in
the EC, similarly, will make it more difficult to perpetrate. 220 Finally,
laws designed to punish more stringently those convicted of fraud or
money laundering may not entirely prevent fraud, but may at least pro-
vide some deterrent effect.
CONCLUSION
International banking faces a plethora of problems and issues as the
next century approaches. As transnational financial services have in-
creased, the significance of national borders has decreased. Banking reg-
ulators will be called upon to coordinate efforts and to cooperate with
their international counterparts. The BCCI scandal presents an impor-
tant illustration of the potential problems faced by international bank
regulators. And, as with most banking scandals, BCCI will surely lead
to a cathartic reevaluation of the existing framework of international
banking regulation and supervision.
Indeed, the future looks promising. The emergence of the Single Mar-
ket in 1992 will create a unified banking community in Europe. The EC
Directives, together with the reforms proposed in the United States and
the spirit of cooperation pervading both the U.S. and the EC proposals,
bode well for increased collaboration among nations, and indeed, for put-
215. See id.
216. Professor Richard Dale suggests that while offshore banking is a legitimate busi-
ness, it should be conducted in jurisdictions such as Great Britain, which have the finan-
cial and regulatory infrastructure to host it responsibly. See BCCI: Regulatory Rights
and Wrongs, supra note 94, at 2.
217. See Dale, supra note 18, at 12, col. 7. Fed General Counsel Virgil Mattingly,
testifying before Congress, said that the Fed's proposals will not solve every supervisory
problem regarding foreign banks, but will lessen the potential for illegal activities by bar-
ring the entry of questionable institutions and providing regulatory and supervisory tools
for investigating and enforcing compliance. See BCCI Hearings, supra note 143, at '6.
218. See generally Lohr, Auditing the Auditors--A Special Report; How BCCI's Ac-
counts Won Stamp of Approval, N.Y. Times, Sept. 16, 1991, at A1, col. 1 (discussing the
role of Price Waterhouse in the BCCI scandal).
219. Paul Maloney, Deputy Assistant Attorney General for the Justice Department's
Criminal Division, suggested these procedural statutes. See Fed-Drafted Bill on Foreign
Control Gets Mixed Reviews Before Senate Banking, supra note 197, at 1042. In addition,
proposals by the Justice Department would allow the U.S. Attorney General to issue
administrative subpoenas, and would make it easier for investigators to obtain bank
records. See id.
220. See ECs Financial Regulations Should Stand the Test of the Worldwide BCCI
Scandal, Thomson's Int'l Banking Reg., Jan. 20, 1992, at 8.
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ting the "super" back in supervision. In the future, there must be a more
defined role for both parent and host nations and for their supervisory
agencies-a development that will eliminate the most vexatious problem
in international banking regulation: the lack of consolidated supervision.
